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SUGGESTED WORKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROPOSED ECONOMIC
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

1. Character of the Committee's Problems. The problems likely to be placed before the proposed Economic Intelligence Committee cannot be fully predicted in advance. Problems of at least four kinds can be expected, however.

a. Intelligence problems of a purely economic character where the Economic Intelligence Committee would be responsible for mobilizing all the available evidence; e.g. a study of production rates in the USSR for military end-products.

b. Intelligence problems of a wider character including National Intelligence Estimates, to which the Economic Intelligence Committee would be asked to contribute, but where its analysis and conclusions must be merged with military and political intelligence; e.g. a study of Soviet intentions and capabilities.

c. Reviews of evidence in particular fields where the form of report would be a statement of agreed major weaknesses and gaps, with accompanying recommendations to the IAC as to the agency which should be responsible for filling them; e.g., a review of evidence on the Soviet oil position.

d. Reviews and mobilization of evidence on particular operational problems, upon the request of any agency and at the discretion of the Committee, where the form of report would be the ad hoc collection of relevant data; e.g., data bearing on a shipment of a strategic material to the Soviet orbit.

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It is evident that the procedures of the Economic Intelligence Committee must be sufficiently flexible to deal with these four types of effort, as well as with others which might develop. It is evident, also, that the use of the machinery of the Committee must be selective and so conducted as to avoid interference with flexible existing arrangements for coordination among the intelligence agencies.

2. Procedure. The Economic Intelligence Committee will at times have problems referred to it by the IAC, ~~or~~ by O/NE, ^{the JCS, etc.} It will also, at its discretion, entertain requests on matters relating to the national security from any other agency. It should, however, lay out a good deal of its own basic work program, by formulating its own conception of the most urgent tasks requiring joint economic intelligence operations and recommending to the IAC programs for the approval of that body.

3. Outlining the Project. When the Economic Intelligence Committee undertakes a project, on request or on its own initiative, it should first consider and agree a draft outline. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to emphasize the importance of this stage of the proceedings; for the definition of the problem, and sorts of issues and data judged to be relevant, are likely to be decisive to the result.

4. Allocation of Responsibilities. Once a rough outline has been agreed by the Committee the several responsibilities of the participating agencies must be defined. This allocation must include responsibility for preparing specific sections of the draft, for invoking the help, where necessary of non-IAC agencies, and for blending the individual contributions into a single paper.

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5. Criticism of the Draft. Normally the draft would come back to the committee for criticism and approval, before forwarding to the requestor.

6. Presentation and Criticism of Evidence. The agency undertaking drafting responsibilities would also have placed upon it the requirement of presenting to the Committee a statement (not necessarily written or formal) of the character and quality of the evidence underlying its main conclusions, as well as an indication of its judgment concerning the principal gaps in knowledge. Perhaps the most important contribution the Committee can make in Washington at the present time is effectively to lead intelligence operations towards a tradition of self-criticism with respect to the quality of its evidence ^(and analysis). A full critique of the evidence would not, of course, be forwarded with the intelligence paper. The paper would, however, be accompanied by an explicit and precise statement of the gaps in evidence, with recommendations concerning the agency to be made responsible for filling them. In short, the attitude within the committee which we should wish to see generated is that the working level people should be completely frank with one another on what they know and what they do not know, but should pass along the conclusions concerning their ignorance in operational form; i.e., in the form of precise recommendations for the filling of priority gaps.

7. The Filling of Gaps. When the IAC finally approves the allocation of responsibility for the filling of a gap in evidence, it would be desirable if the relevant member of the Economic Intelligence Committee took responsibility within his own agency for:

- a. Pushing effectively the priority given by the IAC:
- b. Where useful and possible, contacting directly and briefing in detail the intelligence collecting branch of his agency.

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